IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/119425.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Sovereign Debt and Financial Sector Nexus in the Arab Region

Author

Listed:
  • Awdeh, Ali

Abstract

The Arab region contains several countries that suffer high levels of indebtedness, resulting from decades of weak (if not failing) macroeconomic, fiscal, monetary and trade policies. This indebtedness was further exacerbated by political and security unrest, and lastly by the repercussions of Covid-19 crisis. By end 2019, i.e. before the eruption of Covid-19 pandemic, the government debt-to-GDP ratio reached 200 percent in Sudan, which ranked the country third globally in this indicator. Two other Arab countries recorded government debt-to-GDP ratio above 100 percent, namely Lebanon and Bahrain. Several other Arab countries also record considerably high debt ratios, in particular Yemen, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia. Among other factors, the persistent budget deficit, which is determined by the fiscal policies, is in turn a major determinant of the mounting debt in the Arab region. This high indebtedness resulted in high debt service burden in the Arab countries, which is financed via increased borrowing, higher taxes, and leading to lower government spending, thus imposing liquidity challenges and limits fiscal space which could have otherwise been invested in essential public services, and in financing the Sustainable Development Goals in the Arab countries. Several Arab countries rely heavily on banks to meet their borrowing needs and banks across the Arab region invest considerably in the government securities and dedicate large sums of their resources to finance government budget. The end-2022 data show that approximately 10 percent of the consolidated assets of the Arab banking sector is invested in government debt. The fiscal policies in the Arab countries are indeed responsible for the level of debt held by banks. In particular, budget balance, government debt levels, and interest paid on government debt, are all factors that determine the investment of banks in the domestic sovereign debt. The interconnectedness between fiscal position and bank lending to the government results in the sovereign-bank nexus phenomenon in the Arab region, which poses risks for fiscal sustainability and financial stability. Moreover, the high levels of bank holdings of government debt in several Arab countries may result in two repercussions: firstly, a high exposure of banks to sovereign risk and ratings downgrade following sovereign downgrade; and secondly, a crowding out effects for private sector and depriving businesses from the needed funding. To avoid such scenarios, proper macroprudential and microprudential framework aiming to mitigate the sovereign-bank nexus must be put in place.

Suggested Citation

  • Awdeh, Ali, 2023. "The Sovereign Debt and Financial Sector Nexus in the Arab Region," MPRA Paper 119425, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:119425
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/119425/1/MPRA_paper_119425.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Steven Ongena & Alexander Popov & Neeltje Van Horen, 2019. "The Invisible Hand of the Government: Moral Suasion during the European Sovereign Debt Crisis," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 346-379, October.
    2. M. Ayhan Kose & Franziska Ohnsorge & Naotaka Sugawara, 2020. "Benefits and Costs of Debt: The Dose Makes the Poison," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 2006, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
    3. Steven Ongena & Alexander Popov & Neeltje Van Horen, 2019. "The Invisible Hand of the Government: Moral Suasion during the European Sovereign Debt Crisis," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 346-379, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Koetter, Michael & Krause, Thomas & Tonzer, Lena, 2019. "Delay determinants of European Banking Union implementation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 1-20.
    2. Jack Bekooij & Jon Frost & Remco van der Molen & Krzysztof Muzalewski, 2016. "Hazardous tango: Sovereign-bank interdependencies across countries and time," DNB Working Papers 541, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    3. Cimadomo, Jacopo & Ciminelli, Gabriele & Furtuna, Oana & Giuliodori, Massimo, 2020. "Private and public risk sharing in the euro area," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 121(C).
    4. Markus K. Brunnermeier & Sam Langfield & Marco Pagano & Ricardo Reis & Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh & Dimitri Vayanos, 2017. "ESBies: safety in the tranches," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 32(90), pages 175-219.
    5. Eidam, Frederik, 2018. "Gap-filling government debt maturity choice," ZEW Discussion Papers 18-025, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    6. Reint Gropp & Thomas Mosk & Steven Ongena & Carlo Wix, 2019. "Banks Response to Higher Capital Requirements: Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 32(1), pages 266-299.
    7. Kirschenmann, Karolin & Korte, Josef & Steffen, Sascha, 2017. "The zero risk fallacy? Banks' sovereign exposure and sovereign risk spillovers," ZEW Discussion Papers 17-069, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    8. Leonello, Agnese, 2018. "Government guarantees and the two-way feedback between banking and sovereign debt crises," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(3), pages 592-619.
    9. Carlo Altavilla & Marco Pagano & Saverio Simonelli, 2017. "Bank Exposures and Sovereign Stress Transmission," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 21(6), pages 2103-2139.
    10. Christophe Destais & Frederik Eidam & Friedrich Heinemann, 2019. "The design of a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism for the euro area: Choices and trade-offs," EconPol Policy Reports 11, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
    11. Baziki, Selva Bahar & Nieto, María J. & Turk-Ariss, Rima, 2023. "Sovereign portfolio composition and bank risk: The case of European banks," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    12. Beetsma, Roel & Giuliodori, Massimo & Hanson, Jesper & de Jong, Frank, 2018. "Bid-to-cover and yield changes around public debt auctions in the euro area," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 118-134.
    13. Ferrando, Annalisa & Popov, Alexander & Udell, Gregory F., 2017. "Sovereign stress and SMEs’ access to finance: Evidence from the ECB's SAFE survey," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 65-80.
    14. Ari, Anil, 2018. "Gambling traps," Working Paper Series 2217, European Central Bank.
    15. Matteo Crosignani, 2015. "Why Are Banks Not Recapitalized During Crises?," Working Papers 203, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank).
    16. Mr. Giovanni Dell'Ariccia & Caio Ferreira & Nigel Jenkinson & Mr. Luc Laeven & Alberto Martin & Ms. Camelia Minoiu & Alex Popov, 2018. "Managing the Sovereign-Bank Nexus," IMF Departmental Papers / Policy Papers 2018/016, International Monetary Fund.
    17. Frey, Rainer & Weth, Mark, 2019. "Banks' holdings of risky sovereign bonds in the absence of the nexus: Yield seeking with central bank funding or de-risking?," Discussion Papers 19/2019, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    18. R. S.J. Koijen & F. Koulischer & B. Nguyen & M. Yogo, 2016. "Quantitative Easing in the Euro Area: The Dynamics of Risk Exposures and the Impact on Asset Prices," Working papers 601, Banque de France.
    19. Anil Ari, 2015. "Sovereign Risk and Bank Risk-Taking," Working Papers 202, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Sovereign Debt; Financial Sector Stability.;

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • H6 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
    • H68 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Forecasts of Budgets, Deficits, and Debt

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:119425. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Joachim Winter (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.