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Association of Number of Bidders and Minimum Bid Ratio (AEr) with Effect of E-bidding of Different Project

Author

Listed:
  • Mishra, Anjay Kumar
  • Bahadur K. C., Megh
  • Aithal, Sreeramana

Abstract

The purpose of this research is to analyze the relation between the number of bidders versus the minimum bid ratio (AEr)/percentage below the initial engineer’s estimate to type and size of project within Road Divisions Butwal and Shivapur. Bidding data of four consecutive fiscal years starting from 072/73 of two Road Divisions which are already completed its procurement stage were analyzed. The percentage below/contract awarded cost is directly proportional or a significant correlation was found with the number of the participated bidder in any project s of both divisions during the data study period. Bidders have to bid below 20% of the initial estimate that was found to get a project in hand by contractors and they are willing to bid low for the utilization of resources, types of equipment, manpower, and also to get experiences. This research revealed correlation coefficients between the number of bidders and percentage below engineers' estimates are 0.61 for the Butwal division and 0.67 for the Shivapur division. Correlation coefficients 0.82 and 0.83 was found in Nepalgunj and Mahendranagar. Percentage below engineers' estimate depends on 67 and 69% on the number of bidders in Nepalgunj and Mahendranagar respectively. E-bidding helped to promote competition along with low bidding. As there is 17% below with only hardcopy bidding but with e-bid the below percentages rises to 28% with more number of bidder per project. Improvement in existing offer granting framework with additional capability rules ought to be engaged by doling out the weight in the monitory term, soliciting a technique from the proclamation, upgraded e-offering framework, and affirmation for venture exhibitions of the undertaking before execution. This research would be useful for those who are involving in policy making and governing agencies like Public Procurement Monitoring Office and for making necessary amendments in existing rules.

Suggested Citation

  • Mishra, Anjay Kumar & Bahadur K. C., Megh & Aithal, Sreeramana, 2020. "Association of Number of Bidders and Minimum Bid Ratio (AEr) with Effect of E-bidding of Different Project," MPRA Paper 103999, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:103999
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Han Hong & Matthew Shum, 2002. "Increasing Competition and the Winner's Curse: Evidence from Procurement," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 69(4), pages 871-898.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    E-bidding; Project Category; Percentage Below Bid; Bid ratio; E-bidding; Hard copy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • M1 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration
    • M10 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - General
    • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics
    • M21 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics - - - Business Economics
    • R4 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics
    • R42 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics - - - Government and Private Investment Analysis; Road Maintenance; Transportation Planning

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