Two-period economies with private state verification
AbstractPrivate state verification is introduced in a two-period economy with spot markets in both periods and complete futures markets for contingent delivery in the second period. Existence of equilibrium is established, under standard assumptions. An example is presented in which a complete set of contingent markets allows agents to arrive at the optimal allocation of risk-bearing, while securities are not sufficient.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto in its series FEP Working Papers with number 374.
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: May 2010
Date of revision:
General equilibrium; Asymmetric information; Private state verification; Two-period economies;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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