Changes in governance, the market for corporate control, and the mechanisms for hostile takeovers in Continental Europe: The case of Arcelor?s takeover by Mittal Steel
AbstractThis paper describes the changes in governance, the market for corporate control, and the mechanism for hostile takeovers that have occurred in the last decade in Continental Europe, using the hostile takeover of Arcelor by Mittal Steel to illustrate these changes.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by globADVANTAGE, Polytechnic Institute of Leiria in its series Working Papers with number 87.
Date of creation: 07 Feb 2012
Date of revision:
governance; market for corporate control; hostile takeovers; Arcelor takeover;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- M0 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - General
- M1 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Administration
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