This paper studies political cycles in a setting of international interdependence. Three main results are obtained. First in this context the political cycles caused by domestic elections are usually larger than is indicated in the previous literature. Second, political cycles can be generated by foreign elections, and cycles caused by domestic and foreign elections have opposite effects. Finally, if elections are held simultaneously at home and abroad, the amplitude of the political cycle is smaller when the same coalition wins in both countries and larger when the winning coalition is different.
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Paper provided by Department of Economics, Parma University (Italy) in its series Economics Department Working Papers with number
2002-EP02.
Find related papers by JEL classification: E22 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomics: Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Capital; Investment; Capacity E60 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - General
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Alberto Alesina, 1988.
"Macroeconomics and Politics,"
NBER Chapters,
in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1988, Volume 3, pages 13-62
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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