Political cycles and international interdependence
AbstractThis paper studies political cycles in a setting of international interdependence. Three main results are obtained. First in this context the political cycles caused by domestic elections are usually larger than is indicated in the previous literature. Second, political cycles can be generated by foreign elections, and cycles caused by domestic and foreign elections have opposite effects. Finally, if elections are held simultaneously at home and abroad, the amplitude of the political cycle is smaller when the same coalition wins in both countries and larger when the winning coalition is different.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, Parma University (Italy) in its series Economics Department Working Papers with number 2002-EP02.
Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: 2002
Date of revision:
Political cycles; elections; international interdependence;
Other versions of this item:
- Menegatti, Mario, 2005. "Political Cycles and International Interdependence," Economia Internazionale / International Economics, Camera di Commercio di Genova, vol. 58(3), pages 353-365.
- E22 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Capital; Investment; Capacity
- E60 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-11-30 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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