This paper shows that when moving from the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to a Customs Union (CU), the general equilibrium impacts on Canadian GDP and welfare, of removing Rules of Origin (ROO), are potentially larger than the small effects resulting from the adoption of a common external tariff (CET). Therefore, proposals for a CU should not be dismissed solely on the basis that the establishment of a CET would marginally affect Canada while the negotiation process with the U.S. would be long and difficult -- rules of origin liberalization matters more than a common external tariff for Canada.
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Paper provided by University of Ottawa, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
0704E.