Relationship-specific Investment as a Barrier to Entry
AbstractIn this paper, we construct an interregional trade model that has en- dogenous fertility rates in the manner of Helpman and Krugman (1985). The presented model shows that fertility rates in a large region become lower than those in a small region because of the agglomeration of man- ufacturing firms in the former. The agglomeration of firms in a region lowers the relative price of manufactured goods to child rearing costs, which raises the fertility rates. We also find that a decline in transportation costs results in the ag- glomeration of manufacturing firms, which lowers fertility rates in both large and small regions. Finally, we extend our two-region model to a multi-region model and find that the number of manufacturing firms in larger regions is always greater than that in smaller regions, meaning that fertility rates in the former are always lower than those in the latter.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) in its series Discussion Papers in Economics and Business with number 13-24.
Length: 46 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2013
Date of revision:
Vertical Relation; Entry Deterrence; Relationship-Specific Investment; Switch- ing Costs;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-09-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2013-09-28 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-DEM-2013-09-28 (Demographic Economics)
- NEP-GEO-2013-09-28 (Economic Geography)
- NEP-IND-2013-09-28 (Industrial Organization)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Levine's Working Paper Archive
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