Child Allowances, Fertility, and Uncertain Lifetime
AbstractWe examine how child-allowance policies with pay-as-you-go systems affect fertility and growth rates. A current method to subsidize child-rearing households, which determines benefits according to familyfs number of children, increases the fertility rate but decreases the growth rate. This study also demonstrates that when a government initiates a child-allowance policy using some part of the pension budget, the fertility rate declines in aging economies.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) in its series Discussion Papers in Economics and Business with number 05-11.
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: May 2005
Date of revision:
Fertility; Social security; Uncertain lifetime.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D91 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice - - - Intertemporal Household Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving
- H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
- J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
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