This paper examines the effects of performance incentives in a federal job training program for the poor. I find that job training bureaucrats respond to incentives in ways that are consistent with a simple model of bureaucratic behavior. Additionally I am able to test whether attempts by the program's incentive designers to improve the precision of performance measures in the late 1980s increased or decreased efficiency. My ability to relate precisely formulated, agent-level incentives to precisely measured agent-level performance outcomes, activities, and productivity sets this paper apart from most other empirical studies of incentives in organizations. I discuss my results in the context of the greater incentive literature, as well as the literature on incentives in job training programs.
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Paper provided by University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number
00-09.
Length: Date of creation: 2000 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:nya:albaec:00-09
Contact details of provider: Postal: Department of Economics, BA 110 University at Albany State University of New York Albany, NY 12222 U.S.A. Phone: (518) 442-4735 Fax: (518) 442-4736