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Incentive Compatible Control of Decentralized Organizations

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  • Theodore Groves

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  • Theodore Groves, 1975. "Incentive Compatible Control of Decentralized Organizations," Discussion Papers 166, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  • Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:166
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    File URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/166.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. J. H. Dreze & D. de la Vallee Poussin, 1971. "A Tâtonnement Process for Public Goods," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 38(2), pages 133-150.
    2. Groves, Theodore & Loeb, Martin, 1975. "Incentives and public inputs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 211-226, August.
    3. Kenneth J. Arrow, 1964. "Control in Large Organizations," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 10(3), pages 397-408, April.
    4. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-631, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hofmann, Christian & Pfeiffer, Thomas, 2001. "Investitionsbudgetierung und Anreizprobleme: Ist der Groves-Mechanismus nur third-best? Zur Effizienz des Groves-Budgetierungsmechanismus," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-249, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
    2. Charles Corbett & Frank Debets & Luk Wassenhove, 1996. "An efficient budget allocation policy for decentralisation of responsibility for site decontamination projects," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 7(3), pages 287-305, April.

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