Corruption and Trade in General Equilibrium
AbstractWe use the HOSV model of trade to find out a link between corruption and the pattern of trade, not just its effect on the volume of trade. We prove that greater corruption in labor-abundant countries will restrict the volume of world trade while corrupt capital-abundant countries promote trade. This is caused by intermediaries who are engaged in mitigating the transaction cost of corruption. Relatively corrupt economy will export capital-intensive goods. However, relatively capital-abundant country will be worse off with increasing degree of corruption at home and abroad, whereas the labor-abundant country may gain from further corruption.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Nottingham, GEP in its series Discussion Papers with number 08/15.
Date of creation:
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: School of Economics University of Nottingham University Park Nottingham NG7 2RD
Phone: (44) 0115 951 5620
Fax: (0115) 951 4159
Web page: http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/gep/index.aspx
More information through EDIRC
Corruption; International Trade; Factor-intensity; General equilibrium;
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Daniel Kaufmann & Shang-Jin Wei, 2000.
"Does 'Grease Money' Speed Up the Wheels of Commerce?,"
IMF Working Papers
00/64, International Monetary Fund.
- Daniel Kaufmann & Shang-Jin Wei, 1999. "Does "Grease Money" Speed Up the Wheels of Commerce?," NBER Working Papers 7093, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kaufman, Daniel & Shang-Jin Wei, 1999. "Does"grease money"speed up the wheels of commerce?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2254, The World Bank.
- Kaufmann, Daniel & Wei, Shang-Jin, 1999. "Does 'Grease Money' Speed Up the Wheels of Commerce?," MPRA Paper 8209, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Hillman, Arye L. & Ursprung, Heinrich W., 1996. "The political economy of trade liberalization in the transition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 783-794, April.
- Marjit, Sugata & Ghosh, Sudeep & Biswas, Amit, 2007.
"Informality, corruption and trade reform,"
European Journal of Political Economy,
Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 777-789, September.
- Lui, Francis T, 1985. "An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(4), pages 760-81, August.
- Trefler, Daniel, 1995. "The Case of the Missing Trade and Other Mysteries," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1029-46, December.
- Bhagwati, Jagdish N, 1982. "Directly Unproductive, Profit-seeking (DUP) Activities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(5), pages 988-1002, October.
- James E. Anderson & Douglas Marcouiller, S.J., 1999.
"Insecurity and the Pattern of Trade: An Empirical Investigation,"
Boston College Working Papers in Economics
418, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 03 Aug 2000.
- James E. Anderson & Douglas Marcouiller, 2002. "Insecurity And The Pattern Of Trade: An Empirical Investigation," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 84(2), pages 342-352, May.
- Hillman, Arye L & Ursprung, Heinrich W, 1988. "Domestic Politics, Foreign Interests, and International Trade Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 719-45, September.
- Jansen, Marion & Nordås, Hildegunn Kyvik, 2004. "Institutions, Trade Policy and Trade Flows," CEPR Discussion Papers 4418, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Mauro, Paolo, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712, August.
- Ronald W. Jones, 1965. "The Structure of Simple General Equilibrium Models," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73, pages 557.
- Mandal, Biswajit, 2009. "Would Recession Induce More Intermediation in the Corrupt Informal Sector?," MPRA Paper 19930, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 10 Jan 2010.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Hilary Hughes).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.