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Health Insurance Coverage and the Disability Insurance Application Decision

Author

Listed:
  • Jonathan Gruber
  • Jeffrey Kubik

Abstract

We investigate the effect of health insurance coverage on the decision of individuals to apply for Disability Insurance (DI). Those who qualify for DI receive public insurance under Medicare, but only after a two-year waiting period. This raises concerns that many disabled are going uninsured while they wait for their Medicare coverage. Moreover, the combination of this waiting period and the uncertainty about application acceptance may deter those with health insurance on their jobs, but no alternative source of coverage, from leaving work to apply for DI. Data from the Health and Retirement Survey show that, in fact, uninsurance does not rise during the waiting period for DI benefits; reductions in own employer coverage are small, and are offset by increases in other sources of insurance. Correspondingly, we find that imperfect insurance coverage does deter DI application. Those who have an alternative source of insurance coverage (coverage from a spouse's employer or retiree coverage), are 26 to 74% more likely to apply for DI than those without such an alternative. Thus, limiting this waiting period would not increase the insurance coverage of the disabled in the U.S., but it would significantly increase applications to the DI program.

Suggested Citation

  • Jonathan Gruber & Jeffrey Kubik, 2002. "Health Insurance Coverage and the Disability Insurance Application Decision," NBER Working Papers 9148, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9148
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gruber, Jonathan & Madrian, Brigitte C., 1997. "Employment separation and health insurance coverage," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 349-382, December.
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    5. Jonathan Gruber, 2003. "Medicaid," NBER Chapters, in: Means-Tested Transfer Programs in the United States, pages 15-78, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    7. Parsons, Donald O, 1991. "The Health and Earnings of Rejected Disability Insurance Applicants: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1419-1426, December.
    8. Jonathan Gruber, 2000. "Disability Insurance Benefits and Labor Supply," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(6), pages 1162-1183, December.
    9. David A. Wise, 1996. "Advances in the Economics of Aging," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number wise96-1, July.
    10. Jonathan Gruber & Brigitte C. Madrian, 1996. "Health Insurance and Early Retirement: Evidence from the Availability of Continuation Coverage," NBER Chapters, in: Advances in the Economics of Aging, pages 115-146, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Parsons, Donald O, 1980. "The Decline in Male Labor Force Participation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(1), pages 117-134, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lahiri, Kajal & Song, Jae & Wixon, Bernard, 2008. "A model of Social Security Disability Insurance using matched SIPP/Administrative data," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 145(1-2), pages 4-20, July.
    2. Heim, Bradley & Lurie, Ithai & Mullen, Kathleen J. & Simon, Kosali, 2021. "How Much Do Outside Options Matter? The Effect of Subsidized Health Insurance on Social Security Disability Insurance Benefit Receipt," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
    3. Garrett Anstreicher, 2021. "Does increasing health care access reduce disability insurance caseloads? Evidence from the rural United States," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 30(4), pages 786-802, April.
    4. David H. Autor & Mark G. Duggan, 2006. "The Growth in the Social Security Disability Rolls: A Fiscal Crisis Unfolding," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 20(3), pages 71-96, Summer.
    5. Pinka Chatterji & Yue Li, 2016. "Early Effects of the 2010 Affordable Care Act Medicaid Expansions on Federal Disability Program Participation," NBER Working Papers 22531, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Stacy Berg Dale & James M. Verdier, "undated". "Elimination of Medicare's Waiting Period for Seriously Disabled Adults: Impact on Coverage and Costs," Mathematica Policy Research Reports f9872447c4e644bc8c20cf496, Mathematica Policy Research.
    7. Mark Duggan & Perry Singleton & Jae Song, 2005. "Aching to Retire? The Rise in the Full Retirement Age and its Impact on the Disability Rolls," NBER Working Papers 11811, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
    • I1 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health

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