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Do Union Wealth Concessions Explain Takeover Premiums? The Evidence on Contract Wages

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Author Info
Joshua Rosett
Abstract

I estimate changes in levels of union real wage growrh associated with corporate takeovers and accompanying chief executive officer changes. Ihe effects are statistically insignificant. The results are used to construct union wealth changes assotiated with corporate control events. Target fire shareholder wealth premiums are estimated using a simple market model. The union and shareholder wealth changes are compared, and I conclude that transfers of wealth from unions to shareholders ate not an economically significant explanation of shareholder wealth premiums.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 3187.

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Date of creation: Nov 1989
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:3187

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  1. Jensen, Michael C. & Ruback, Richard S., 1983. "The market for corporate control : The scientific evidence," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-4), pages 5-50, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Charles Brown & James L. Medoff, 1987. "The Impact of Firm Acquisitions on Labor," NBER Working Papers 2273, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Roll, Richard, 1986. "The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(2), pages 197-216, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Bradley, Michael & Desai, Anand & Kim, E. Han, 1988. "Synergistic gains from corporate acquisitions and their division between the stockholders of target and acquiring firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 3-40, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Abowd, John M, 1989. "The Effect of Wage Bargains on the Stock Market Value of the Firm," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(4), pages 774-800, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-25, June.
  7. Frank Lichtenberg & Donald Siegel, 1991. "The Effect of Takeovers on the Employment and Wages of Central-Office and Other Personnel," NBER Working Papers 2895, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Ruback, Richard S., 1983. "Assessing competition in the market for corporate acquisitions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-4), pages 141-153, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, 1989. "Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers," NBER Working Papers 2342, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Jeffrey Pontiff & Andrei Shleifer & Michael S. Weisbach, 1990. "Reversions of Excess Pension Assets after Takeovers," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(4), pages 600-613, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Eckbo, B Espen, 1985. "Mergers and the Market Concentration Doctrine: Evidence from the Capital Market," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(3), pages 325-49, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Kaplan, Steven, 1989. " Management Buyouts: Evidence on Taxes as a," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 44(3), pages 611-32, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Frank R. Lichtenberg & Donald Siegel, 1987. "Productivity and Changes in Ownership of Manufactoring Plants," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 18(1987-3), pages 643-684. [Downloadable!]
  15. Eckbo, B Espen & Wier, Peggy, 1985. "Antimerger Policy under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act: A Reexamination of the Market Power Hypothesis," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(1), pages 119-49, April.
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