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Mandatory Retirement for Judges Improved Performance on U.S. State Supreme Courts

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Listed:
  • Elliott Ash
  • W. Bentley MacLeod

Abstract

Mandatory retirement for judges has often been considered as a policy response to an aging judicial workforce. This paper provides empirical evidence on how mandatory retirement influences judge performance using a wave of such reforms in U.S. state supreme courts as a natural experiment. We find that introducing mandatory retirement improves court performance as measured by output (number of published opinions) and legal influence (number of forward citations to those opinions). While older judges are cited less often than younger judges, the effect of mandatory retirement on performance is much larger than what would be expected from a change in the age distribution. We find some evidence that the additional effect is due to selective attrition and that the presence of older judges reduces the performance of younger judges.

Suggested Citation

  • Elliott Ash & W. Bentley MacLeod, 2020. "Mandatory Retirement for Judges Improved Performance on U.S. State Supreme Courts," NBER Working Papers 28025, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:28025
    Note: AG LE LS
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • J26 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Retirement; Retirement Policies
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
    • J44 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Professional Labor Markets and Occupations
    • K0 - Law and Economics - - General
    • K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior

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