Life After Kyoto: Alternative Approaches to Global Warming
AbstractThis study reviews different approaches to the political and economic control of global public goods like global warming. It compares quantity-oriented control mechanisms like the Kyoto Protocol with price-type control mechanisms such as internationally harmonized carbon taxes. The pros and cons of the two approaches are compared, focusing on such issues as performance under conditions of uncertainty, volatility of the induced carbon prices, the excess burden of taxation and regulation, potential for corruption and accounting finagling, and ease of implementation. It concludes that, although virtually all discussions about economic global public goods have analyzed quantitative approaches, price-type approaches are likely to be more effective and more efficient.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 11889.
Date of creation: Dec 2005
Date of revision:
Publication status: published as Nordhaus, William D. "After Kyoto: Alternative Mechanisms To Control Global Warming," American Economic Review, 2005, v96(2), 31-34.
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- H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- Q5 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-01-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENE-2006-03-16 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2006-02-21 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2006-01-12 (Public Economics)
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