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A Single Fiscal Policy in the Euro Area: Vision or Utopia?

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Author Info
Konrad Szelag
Abstract

EMU has a unique macroeconomic framework that combines a single monetary policy with coordinated national economic and fiscal policies. Since the coordination process has some serious weaknesses despite having been modified several times in recent years, the idea of a single economic/fiscal policy is being discussed as a potential alternative solution for the euro area. On the one hand, there are reasonable economic arguments in favor of a single fiscal policy, such as the need to formulate an aggregate fiscal stance for the euro area as a whole, the need to ensure sustainable macroeconomic stabilization within EMU, and the need for a kind of insurance against asymmetric shocks. On the other hand, establishing the context for a single fiscal policy would require significant changes to the present political, institutional, and macroeconomic design of the EU. Such a context could include full political union with a federal structure, and federal institutions, including an economic government or central fiscal authority for the euro area, with a much larger and restructured general budget at the EU level, and possible abandonment of the rule that the budget must be in balance every year. Currently, neither the political will nor the social support exists in the EU for transferring further national authority to a supranational, European level. Therefore, while it may be desirable, a single fiscal policy in the euro area can only be considered for the long run; it is not an option for the short or medium term.

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Paper provided by National Bank of Poland, Economic Institute in its series National Bank of Poland Working Papers with number 46.

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Length: 56
Date of creation: Mar 2008
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Handle: RePEc:nbp:nbpmis:46

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Related research
Keywords: EMU; the euro area; economic policy coordination; fiscal policy; fiscal federalism; central/federal budget; federation; political union;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
E66 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - General Outlook and Conditions
H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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  1. Beetsma, Roel & Debrun, Xavier & Klaassen, Frank, 2001. "Is Fiscal Policy Coordination in EMU Desirable?," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Stafano Athanasoulis & Eric van Wincoop, 1998. "Risksharing within the United States: what have financial markets and fiscal federalism accomplished?," Research Paper 9808, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Downloadable!]
  3. Olivier Blanchard & Francesco Giavazzi, 2003. "Macroeconomic Effects Of Regulation And Deregulation In Goods And Labor Markets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 118(3), pages 879-907, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Benoiˆt Coeure´ & Jean Pisani-Ferry, 2005. "Fiscal Policy in Emu: Towards a Sustainability and Growth Pact?," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(4), pages 598-617, Winter.
  5. M. Cangiano & Eric Mottu, 1998. "Will Fiscal Policy Be Effective Under EMU?," IMF Working Papers 98/176, International Monetary Fund.
  6. Bayoumi, Tamim & Masson, Paul R., 1995. "Fiscal flows in the United States and Canada: Lessons for monetary union in Europe," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 253-274, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Buiter, Willem H, 2005. "The 'Sense and Nonsense of Maastricht' Revisited: What Have We Learnt About Stabilization In EMU?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5405, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Alan Auerbach, 2002. "Is There a Role for Discretionary Fiscal Policy?," NBER Working Papers 9306, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Buti, Marco & Eijffinger, Sylvester C W & Franco, Daniele, 2003. "Revisiting the Stability and Growth Pact: Grand Design or Internal Adjustment?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3692, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Asdrubali, Pierfederico & Sorensen, Bent E & Yosha, Oved, 1996. "Channels of Interstate Risk Sharing: United States 1963-1990," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 111(4), pages 1081-1110, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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