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EMU in the Early Years: Differences and Credibility

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Author Info
Buti, Marco
Sapir, André

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Abstract

The main issue in the early years of EMU is one of credibility. On one hand, high exposure to asymmetric shocks and low adaptability (be it in terms of stabilization or adjustment) to both symmetric and asymmetric shocks make the early years of EMU potentially problematic. On the other hand, significant economic differences between EMU countries raise questions regarding the objective of price stability. Credibility-enhancing policy choices may, in the short run, conflict with optimal smoothing of shocks, but are essential to ‘ferry’ EMU towards its ‘steady state’. While a number of uncertainties still hang over the new regime, the Paper finds that the experience of EMU so far is heartening. Although economic divergences skewed on the high side made internal monetary misalignments politically less troublesome, the stability-oriented EMU framework fostered broadly appropriate policy behaviour in terms of both efforts to increase adaptability to shocks and of actual response to observed shocks.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 2832.

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Date of creation: Jun 2001
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2832

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Related research
Keywords: EMU; Exposure and Adaptability to Shocks; Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Policy Coordination;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Paola Monperrus-Veroni & Francesco Saraceno, 2005. "Reform of the Stability and Growth Pact: Reducing or Increasing the Nuisance?," Documents de Travail de l'OFCE 2005-01, Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE). [Downloadable!]
  2. Tilman Brück & Andreas Cors & Klaus F. Zimmermann & Rudolf Zwiener, 2002. "Stability Criteria and Convergence: The Role of the System of National Accounts for Fiscal Policy in Europe," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 318, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  3. Maria ELEFTHERIOU, 2003. "On the Robustness of the "Taylor Rule" in the EMU," Economics Working Papers ECO2003/17, European University Institute. [Downloadable!]
  4. Carlos Martinez-Mongay & Khalid Sekkat, 2003. "The tradeoff between efficiency and macroeconomic stabilisation in Europe," Working Papers CEB 04-024.RS, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management, Centre Emile Bernheim (CEB). [Downloadable!]
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  5. Richard Hule & Matthias Sutter, 2003. "Can the Stability and Growth Pact in EMU Cause Budget Deficit Cycles?," Empirica, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 25-38, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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