Conditional Expected Utility
AbstractLet E be a class of event. Conditionally Expected Utility decision makers are decision makers whose conditional preferences %E, E 2 E, satisfy the axioms of Subjective Expected Utility theory (SEU). We extend the notion of unconditional preference that is conditionally EU to unconditional preferences that are not necessarily SEU. We give a representation theorem for a class of such preferences, and show that they are Invariant Bi-separable in the sense of Ghirardato et al.. Then, we consider the special case where the unconditional preference is itself SEU, and compare our results with those of Fishburn .
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 02-2013.
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 2013
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- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-03-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-DCM-2013-03-09 (Discrete Choice Models)
- NEP-GTH-2013-03-09 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2013-03-09 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-UPT-2013-03-09 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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