Duality and optimal strategies in the finitely repeated zero-sum games with incomplete information on both sides
AbstractThe recursive formula for the value of the zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information on both sides is known for a long time. As it is explained in the paper, the usual proof of this formula is in a sense non constructive : it just claims that the players are unable to guarantee a better payoff than the one prescribed by formula, but it does not indicates how the players can guarantee this amount. In this paper we aim to give a constructive approach to this formula using duality techniques. This will allow us to recursively describe the optimal strategies in those games and to apply these results to games with infinite action spaces.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1) in its series Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques with number b05027.
Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2005
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Repeated games; dual games; incomplete information; recurrence formula;
Other versions of this item:
- Bernard De Meyer & Alexandre Marino, 2005. "Duality and optimal strategies in the finitely repeated zero-sum games with incomplete information on both sides," UniversitÃ© Paris1 PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00193996, HAL.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- DE MEYER , Bernard, 1993. "Repeated Games and the Central Limit Theorem," CORE Discussion Papers 1993003, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Bernard De Meyer & Alexandre Marino, 2004. "Repeated market games with lack of information on both sides," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques bla04066, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
- Bernard De Meyer, 2007.
"Price Dynamics on a Stock Market with Asymmetric Information,"
321307000000000841, UCLA Department of Economics.
- De Meyer, Bernard, 2010. "Price dynamics on a stock market with asymmetric information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 42-71, May.
- Bernard De Meyer, 2007. "Price Dynamics on a Stock Market with Asymmetric Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1604, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
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