By allocating di erent information to team members, secret contracts can provide better incentives to perform with an intuitive organizational design. For instance, they may help to monitor monitors, and appoint secret principals. Generally, secret contracts highlight a rich duality between detection and enforcement with linear transfers. On the one hand, disobedient deviations must be detectable to enforce a given outcome, but di erent behavior may be used to detect di erent deviations. On the other hand, disobedient deviations must be attributable, i.e., some individual can be identi ed as innocent, to provide incentives with budget balance.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Minnesota, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
2008-3.
Length: 48 pages Date of creation: 06 2008 Date of revision:
06 2008 Handle: RePEc:min:wpaper:2008-3
Contact details of provider: Postal: 4-101 Hanson Hall, 1925 Fourth Street South, Minneapolis, MN 55455 Phone: (612)625-6353 Fax: (612)624-0209 Email: Web page: http://www.econ.umn.edu/ More information through EDIRC
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Caty Bach).
Did you know? Each page is provided with a technical contact, in case something is not right with the supplied information. See under "publisher info".