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Competing Ways Towards International Antitrust: the WTO versus the ICN

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  • Mariana Bode
  • Oliver Budzinski

    ()
    (Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Philipps Universitaet Marburg)

Abstract

In times of globalization, trade liberalization and deregulation of specific industries, competition authorities face new challenges in order to protect national as well as international competition. With companies operating in various countries, fading market frontiers and increasing crossborder trade, new strategies must be developed in order to overcome threats to domestic markets resulting of anticompetitive behavior abroad. Even though solutions such as the “Effects Doctrine” or bilateral agreements allow – albeit imperfectly – countries to protect their domestic market, there are no laws safeguarding the global economy and international competition. Thus, the request arises to establish an international competition policy regime in order to harmonize countries’ competition laws, to reduce conflicts due to cross-border anti-competitive behavior and to support developing countries in reaching Western standards. Among several approaches, two are of significant interest: On the one hand, the World Trade Organization (WTO) could be enhanced by a board of supervision for international competition issues including a harmonized competition code for all, while on the other hand the International Competition Network (ICN) has been established to take care of global competition concerns through policy coordination [Graham 2003; Janow 2003; Budzinski 2004b]. This paper discusses whether the institutional WTO or the voluntary ICN approach represents the better path to an international competition policy regime to control private anticompetitive activities. The second part will explain the importance of an international competition policy. Subsequently, unilateral, bilateral and multilateral approaches to the prevention and solution of problems in global competition are introduced. Section 3.1 gives a short overview of the WTO’s characteristics, its structural organization and its plans to integrate an international competition policy. The organization and the framework of the ICN as well as its attempts to prevent international anticompetitive behavior is explored in section 3.2. Based on the statements made in section 2 and the facts presented in section 3, the fourth section compares the WTO approach with the ICN qualities. The discussion will be divided into the following six criteria: (i) feasibility, (ii) acceptability, (iii) efficiency, (iv) negotiation and implementation of international competition rules, (v) conflict resolution and (vi) adaptability. Conclusions follow in section 5.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung) in its series Marburg Working Papers on Economics with number 200503.

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Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mar:volksw:200503

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  1. Lars P Feld, 2004. "On Tax Competition: The (Un-)Expected Advantages of Decentralized Fiscal Autonomy," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200425, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  2. Lars P. Feld & Gebhard Kirchgässner, 2004. "The Role of Direct Democracy in the European Union," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200423, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  3. Bernd Hayo, 2004. "Happiness in Eastern Europe," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200412, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  4. Lars P. Feld & Gebhard Kirchgässner, 2004. "Sustainable Fiscal Policy in a Federal System: Switzerland as an Example," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200424, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  5. Thomas Döring & Stefan Heiland & Martin Tischer, 2004. "Kommunale Nachhaltigkeitsindikatorensysteme in Deutschland: zum aktuellen Stand von Entwicklung und Anwendung," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 73(1), pages 96-111.
  6. Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, 2004. "Illegal, Immoral, Fattening or What?: How Deterrence and Responsive Regulation Shape Tax Morale," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200426, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
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Cited by:
  1. Oliver Budzinski, 2009. "An international multilevel competition policy system," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 6(4), pages 367-389, December.

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