IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/lev/wrkpap/wp_116.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Regulation and Supervision of Bank Holding Companies: A Historical Perspective

Author

Listed:
  • Ronnie J. Phillips

Abstract

Scholars have generally concluded that the assigning of the BHC responsibilities to the Fed in 1956 was primarily based on the historical precedent of the Clayton Act and the Banking Act of 1933 which granted some powers to the Federal Reserve with respect to bank holding companies. This explanation is not sufficient because bank holding company bills had been introduced since 1930 and it is only after 1943 that the Federal Reserve is designated as the regulatory agency for BHCs. Why was there a change? There are three factors which together explain why the Federal Reserve was selected as the regulatory agency. The first, and probably most important, was in the legislative response to the public outcry over the abuses of bank affiliates. The bank affiliates and holding company issues were intertwined, and the outcome of the Banking Act of 1933 had important implications for the future regulation of BHCs. If the separation of commercial and investment banking had not occurred, the OCC would quite likely have been the regulatory agency for BHCs. It was recognized that a system of universal banking (national banks with addiliates) required a single regulator. Second, legislation proposed by Marriner Eccles and the Federal Reserve in 1943 to control BHCs specified the Federal Reserve as the regulatory agency, despite the fact that at the time there was little rationale for this. However, the bill introduced in 1943 became the BHCA of 1956. Third, the Comptroller of the Currency in 1956, Ray Gidney, believed that BHCs promoted efficiency in banking and needed little regulation. Those members of Congress who believed that BHCs should be tightly controlled, or abolished, had little incentive to entrust the regulation and supervision of BHCs to Gidney. If the comptroller of the Currency at the time had been a strong opponent of the expansion of BHCs, then there might have been reason to change the legislation. A reexamination of the reasons for granting regulatory power ove
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Ronnie J. Phillips, 1994. "The Regulation and Supervision of Bank Holding Companies: A Historical Perspective," Economics Working Paper Archive wp_116, Levy Economics Institute.
  • Handle: RePEc:lev:wrkpap:wp_116
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp116.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mark D. Flood, 1992. "The great deposit insurance debate," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jul, pages 51-77.
    2. James R. Barth & R. Dan Brumbaugh Jr., "undated". "Financing Prosperity in the Next Century, The Changing World of Banking: Setting the Regulatory Agenda," Economics Public Policy Brief Archive 8, Levy Economics Institute.
    3. Tyler Cowen & Randall Kroszner, 1990. "Mutual Fund Banking: A Market Approach," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 10(1), pages 223-237, Spring/Su.
    4. Kenneth Spong, 2000. "Banking regulation : its purposes, implementation, and effects," Monograph, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, number 2000bria.
    5. Thomas G. Watkins & Robert Craig West, 1982. "Bank holding companies: development and regulation," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, vol. 67(Jun), pages 3-13.
    6. Anna J. Schwartz, 1992. "The misuse of the Fed's discount window," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Sep, pages 58-69.
    7. Timberlake, Richard H., 1993. "Monetary Policy in the United States," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226803845, November.
    8. Steindl, Frank G., 1991. "The monetary economics of Lauchlin Currie," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 445-461, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ronnie J. Phillips, "undated". "Narrow Banking Reconsidered, The Functional Approach to Financial Reform," Economics Public Policy Brief Archive ppb_17, Levy Economics Institute.
    2. Selgin, George & Lastrapes, William D. & White, Lawrence H., 2012. "Has the Fed been a failure?," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 569-596.
    3. Robert L. Hetzel, 2009. "Should increased regulation of bank risk-taking come from regulators or from the market?," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, vol. 95(Spr), pages 161-200.
    4. Corinne Aaron-Cureau & Hubert Kempf, 2006. "Bargaining over monetary policy in a monetary union and the case for appointing an independent central banker," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 58(1), pages 1-27, January.
    5. Jon R. Moen & Ellis W. Tallman, 2007. "Liquidity creation without a lender of last resort: clearinghouse loan certificates in the Banking Panic of 1907," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2006-23, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    6. Hautcoeur, Pierre-Cyrille & Riva, Angelo & White, Eugene N., 2014. "Floating a “lifeboat”: The Banque de France and the crisis of 1889," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 104-119.
    7. Rose M. Kushmeider, 2007. "Restructuring U.S. Federal Financial Regulation," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 25(3), pages 325-340, July.
    8. Beckmann, Joscha & Belke, Ansgar & Dreger, Christian, 2017. "The relevance of international spillovers and asymmetric effects in the Taylor rule," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 162-170.
    9. Sajjad Zaheer & Steven Ongena & Sweder J.G. van Wijnbergen, 2013. "The Transmission of Monetary Policy Through Conventional and Islamic Banks," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 9(4), pages 175-224, December.
    10. Robert L. Hetzel, 2014. "The Real Bills Views of the Founders of the Fed," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue 2Q, pages 159-181.
    11. Gary Pecquet & Clifford Thies, 2010. "Money in occupied New Orleans, 1862–1868: A test of Selgin’s “salvaging” of Gresham’s Law," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 23(2), pages 111-126, June.
    12. Retselisitsoe I. Thamae & Nicholas M. Odhiambo, 2022. "The impact of bank regulation on bank lending: a review of international literature," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 23(4), pages 405-418, December.
    13. Abdelaati Daouia & Léopold Simar & Paul W. Wilson, 2017. "Measuring firm performance using nonparametric quantile-type distances," Econometric Reviews, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 36(1-3), pages 156-181, March.
    14. Hubert P. Janicki & Edward Simpson Prescott, 2006. "Changes in the size distribution of U.S. banks: 1960-2005," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, vol. 92(Fall), pages 291-316.
    15. Michael D. Bordo & David C. Wheelock, 2010. "The promise and performance of the Federal Reserve as lender of last resort 1914-1933," Working Papers 2010-036, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    16. William L. Weber & Michael Devaney, 1999. "Bank Efficiency, Risk‐Based Capital, and Real Estate Exposure: The Credit Crunch Revisited," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 27(1), pages 1-25, March.
    17. anonymous, 2007. "Nonbanks and risk in retail payments," Payments System Research Working Paper PSR WP 07-02, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
    18. Clements Adeyinka Akinsoyinu, 2015. "The Impact of Capital Regulation on Bank Capital and Risk Decision. Evidence for European Global Systemically Important Banks," International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences, Human Resource Management Academic Research Society, International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences, vol. 5(3), pages 167-177, July.
    19. Mark A. Wynne, 1999. "The European system of central banks," Economic and Financial Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, issue Q I, pages 2-14.
    20. Jean-Charles Rochet & Xavier Vives, 2004. "Coordination Failures and the Lender of Last Resort: Was Bagehot Right After All?," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(6), pages 1116-1147, December.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:lev:wrkpap:wp_116. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Elizabeth Dunn (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.levyinstitute.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.