Bank lending networks, experience, reputation, and borrowing costs
AbstractWe investigate the network structure of syndicated lending markets and evaluate the impact of lenders’ network centrality, considered as measures of their experience and reputation, on borrowing costs. We show that the market for syndicated loans is a “small world” characterized by large local density and short social distances between lenders. Such a network structure allows for better information and resources flows between banks thus enhancing their social capital. We then show that lenders’ experience and reputation play a significant role in reducing loan spreads and thus increasing borrower’s wealth.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie (LaRGE), Université de Strasbourg (France) in its series Working Papers of LaRGE Research Center with number 2010-07.
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
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Agency costs; bank syndicate; experience; loan syndication; reputation; small world; social network analysis.;
Other versions of this item:
- Christophe J. Godlewski & Bulat Sanditov & Thierry Burger-Helmchen, 2010. "Bank lending networks, experience, reputation, and borrowing costs," Working Papers of BETA 2010-16, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-06-26 (All new papers)
- NEP-BAN-2010-06-26 (Banking)
- NEP-CTA-2010-06-26 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-FMK-2010-06-26 (Financial Markets)
- NEP-NET-2010-06-26 (Network Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2010-06-26 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
- NEP-URE-2010-06-26 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Di Cagno, Daniela & Sciubba, Emanuela, 2010. "Trust, trustworthiness and social networks: Playing a trust game when networks are formed in the lab," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 156-167, August.
- Dai, Meixing, 2010.
"External constraint and financial crises with balance sheet effects,"
21625, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Meixing Dai, 2012. "External Constraint and Financial Crises with Balance Sheet Effects," International Economic Journal, Korean International Economic Association, vol. 26(4), pages 567-585, March.
- Meixing DAI, 2009. "External constraint and financial crises with balance sheet effects," Working Papers of BETA 2009-02, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
- Meixing Dai, 2010. "External constraint and financial crises with balance sheet effects," Working Papers of BETA 2010-23, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christophe J. Godlewski).
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