How to play the games? Nash versus Berge behavior rules
AbstractSocial interactions regularly lead to mutually beneficial transactions that are sometimes puzzling. The prisoner’s dilemma and the chicken and trust games prove to be less perplexing than Nash equilibrium predicts. Moral preferences seem to complement self-oriented motivations and their relative predominance in games is found to vary according to the individuals, their environment, and the game. This paper examines the appropriateness of Berge equilibrium to study several 2×2 game situations, notably cooperative games where mutual support yields socially better outcomes. We consider the Berge behavior rule complementarily to Nash: individuals play one behavior rule or another, depending on the game situation. We then define non-cooperative Berge equilibrium, discuss what it means to play in this fashion, and argue why individuals may choose to do so. Finally, we discuss the relationship between Nash and Berge notions and analyze the rationale of individuals playing in a situational perspective.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier in its series Working Papers with number 11-05.
Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2011
Date of revision: Feb 2011
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Avenue Raymond Dugrand, CS 79606, 34960 Montpellier Cedex 2
Web page: http://www.lameta.univ-montp1.fr/
More information through EDIRC
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-05-07 (All new papers)
- NEP-EVO-2011-05-07 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2011-05-07 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2011-05-07 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Patricia Modat).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.