This paper provides an axiomatic characterization of a family of so-called efficient maxmin solutions which can be seen as generalizations of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution to nonconvex n-person bargaining problems. Moreover, it is shown that even though there are several efficient maxmin solutions for some bargaining problems, there is typically a unique efficient maxmin solution.
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Paper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number
98-20.
Length: 18 pages Date of creation: Dec 1998 Date of revision: Publication status: Published in: Economic Theory 21(1) 2003, 81-95 Handle: RePEc:kud:kuiedp:9820
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory