n-Person Nonconvex Bargaining: Efficient Proportional Solution
AbstractFor n-person bargaining problems the family of proportional solutions (introduced and characterized by Kalai) is generalized to bargaining problems with non-convex payoff sets. The so-called "efficient proportional solutions" are characterized axiomatically using natural extensions of the original axioms provided by Kalai.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 10-21.
Length: 9 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2010
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Øster Farimagsgade 5, Building 26, DK-1353 Copenhagen K., Denmark
Phone: (+45) 35 32 30 10
Fax: +45 35 32 30 00
Web page: http://www.econ.ku.dk
More information through EDIRC
n-person non-convex bargaining; proportional solutions; egalitarian solution;
Other versions of this item:
- Jens Leth Hougaard & Mich Tvede, 2010. "n-Person Nonconvex Bargaining: Efficient Proportional Solutions," MSAP Working Paper Series, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics 02_2010, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics.
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-10-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2010-10-02 (Game Theory)
- NEP-ORE-2010-10-02 (Operations Research)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Serrano, Roberto & Shimomura, Ken-Ichi, 1998. "Beyond Nash Bargaining Theory: The Nash Set," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 286-307, December.
- Chun, Youngsub & Thomson, William, 1992.
"Bargaining problems with claims,"
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier,
Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 19-33, August.
- Jens Leth Hougaard & Mich Tvede, 2003.
"Nonconvex n-person bargaining: efficient maxmin solutions,"
Economic Theory, Springer,
Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 81-95, 01.
- Jens Leth Hougaard & Mich Tvede, 1998. "Nonconvex n-Person Bargaining: Efficient Maxmin Solutions," Discussion Papers 98-20, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
- Hougaard, Jens Leth & Tvede, Mich, 2002.
"Benchmark selection: An axiomatic approach,"
European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier,
Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 218-228, February.
- Ehud Kalai, 1977.
"Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons,"
Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
179, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Kalai, Ehud, 1977. "Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 45(7), pages 1623-30, October.
- Ismail Saglam, 2012.
"Endogenously Proportional Bargaining Solutions,"
KoÃ§ University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum
1232, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Hoffmann).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.