Tax Responses in Platform Industries
AbstractTwo-sided platform firms serve distinct customer groups that are connected through interdependent demand, and include major businesses such as the media industry, banking, and the software industry. A well known result of tax incidence is that consumers of a more heavily taxed good pay a higher price and thus buy less of the good. The present paper shows that this result need not hold in a two-sided market. On the contrary, a higher ad valorem tax may lower end-user prices and spur sales. Thus, two-sided platform firms may not at all engage in tax shifting via price increases. We further show that a higher ad valorem tax may undermine a firm's incentive to differentiate its product from that of its competitors. Finally, we demonstrate that the effects of increasing specific taxes may be the opposite of those of increasing value added taxes.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics in its series EPRU Working Paper Series with number 2010-02.
Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2010
Date of revision:
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Other versions of this item:
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- H22 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Incidence
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ACC-2010-04-17 (Accounting & Auditing)
- NEP-ALL-2010-04-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-MIC-2010-04-17 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-PBE-2010-04-17 (Public Economics)
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- Bombana, Roberto & Marchese, Carla, 2012.
"Designing Fees for Music Copyright Holders in Radio Services,"
POLIS Working Papers
166, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
- Roberto Bombana & Carla Marchese, 2014. "Designing fees for music copyright holders in radio services," ECONOMIA E POLITICA INDUSTRIALE, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2014(2), pages 5-19.
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