When Is a Central Bank Governor Fired? Evidence Based on a New Data Set
AbstractThis paper uses a new data set on the term in office of central bank governors in 137 countries covering the period 1970-2004 to estimate a model for the chance that a central bank governor is replaced. We formulate a number of hypotheses based on the literature on the determinants of central bank independence that are tested using conditional logit models and the Extreme Bounds Analysis. We conclude that, apart from the share of the current term in office elapsed, high levels of political and regime instability, the occurrence of elections, and high inflation increase the probability of a turnover.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich in its series KOF Working papers with number 06-143.
Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2006
Date of revision:
central bank governors; central bank independence;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-02-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBA-2007-02-03 (Central Banking)
- NEP-HIS-2007-02-03 (Business, Economic & Financial History)
- NEP-MAC-2007-02-03 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-MON-2007-02-03 (Monetary Economics)
- NEP-POL-2007-02-03 (Positive Political Economics)
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