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When Is a Central Bank Governor Fired? Evidence Based on a New Data Set

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Abstract

This paper uses a new data set on the term in office of central bank governors in 137 countries covering the period 1970-2004 to estimate a model for the chance that a central bank governor is replaced. We formulate a number of hypotheses based on the literature on the determinants of central bank independence that are tested using conditional logit models and the Extreme Bounds Analysis. We conclude that, apart from the share of the current term in office elapsed, high levels of political and regime instability, the occurrence of elections, and high inflation increase the probability of a turnover.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich in its series KOF Working papers with number 06-143.

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Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:kof:wpskof:06-143

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Keywords: central bank governors; central bank independence;

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Cited by:
  1. Miguel Rueda, 2008. "Credibilidad en la política monetaria: Papel de políticas en la estabilidad del Presidente del Banco Central," Research Department Publications, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department 4586, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
  2. Garima Vasishtha & Taimur Baig & Manmohan S. Kumar & Edda Zoli, 2006. "Fiscal and Monetary Nexus in Emerging Market Economies," IMF Working Papers 06/184, International Monetary Fund.
  3. King Banaian, 2007. "Measuring Central Bank Independence: Ordering, Ranking, or Scoring?," Working Papers, Saint Cloud State University, Department of Economics 2008-3 Classification-E58, Saint Cloud State University, Department of Economics, revised 28 Feb 2008.
  4. Miguel Rueda, 2008. "Breaking Credibility in Monetary Policy: The Role of Politics in the Stability of the Central Banker," Research Department Publications, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department 4585, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.

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