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On Coalitional Stability and Single-peakedness

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  • Hirofumi Yamamura

    (Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration (RIEB), Kobe University, Japan)

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    Abstract

    We study a one-dimensional voting game in which voters choose a policy from a one-dimensional policy set over which voters have single-peaked preferences. The purpose of this paper is to analyze coalitional behaviors under any given voting mechanism. We employ the notion of strong Nash equilibrium and identify a necessary and su¢ cient condition for a voting mechanism to possess a strong Nash equilibrium by using the minimax theorem. We moreover show that any strong Nash outcome, if it exists, results in an outcome recommended by a particular augmented median voter rule.

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    File URL: http://www.rieb.kobe-u.ac.jp/academic/ra/dp/English/DP2011-21.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2011
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University in its series Discussion Paper Series with number DP2011-21.

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    Length: 26 pages
    Date of creation: May 2011
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:kob:dpaper:dp2011-21

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    Related research

    Keywords: Single-peakedness; Augmented median voter rule; Strong Nash equilibrium; Coalition-proof Nash Equilibrium; Minimax theorem; Manipulation;

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