On Coalitional Stability and Single-peakedness
AbstractWe study a one-dimensional voting game in which voters choose a policy from a one-dimensional policy set over which voters have single-peaked preferences. The purpose of this paper is to analyze coalitional behaviors under any given voting mechanism. We employ the notion of strong Nash equilibrium and identify a necessary and su¢ cient condition for a voting mechanism to possess a strong Nash equilibrium by using the minimax theorem. We moreover show that any strong Nash outcome, if it exists, results in an outcome recommended by a particular augmented median voter rule.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University in its series Discussion Paper Series with number DP2011-21.
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: May 2011
Date of revision:
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Single-peakedness; Augmented median voter rule; Strong Nash equilibrium; Coalition-proof Nash Equilibrium; Minimax theorem; Manipulation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-05-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2011-05-24 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2011-05-24 (Game Theory)
- NEP-POL-2011-05-24 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-PUB-2011-05-24 (Public Finance)
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