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Punishment-Dominance Condition on Stable Two-Sided Matching Algorithms

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  • Takuya Masuzawa

    (Faculty of Economics, Keio University)

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    Abstract

    In this article, we consider a many-to-one two-sided matching market and define a canonical strategic form game, in which any worker applies to the top k firms and is assigned to the most preferred firm that does not reject him/her. Under the substitute property of firms' preferences, the game satisfies the punishment-dominance condition. The deferred-acceptance algorithm by Gale and Shapley (Amer. Math. Monthly 69: 1962), which finds the maximum and minimum of stable matchings, is described as an instance of the algorithm by Masuzawa (Int. Jour. Game Theory 38: 2008), which determines the α-cores of the strategic form games with the punishment-dominance condition.

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    File URL: http://ies.keio.ac.jp/old_project/old/gcoe-econbus/pdf/dp/DP2012-018.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Keio/Kyoto Joint Global COE Program in its series Keio/Kyoto Joint Global COE Discussion Paper Series with number 2012-018.

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    Length: 14 pages
    Date of creation: Oct 2012
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:kei:dpaper:2012-018

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    Web page: http://ies.keio.ac.jp/old_project/old/gcoe-econbus/
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    1. Kelso, Alexander S, Jr & Crawford, Vincent P, 1982. "Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1483-1504, November.
    2. Hendrickx, R.L.P. & Borm, P.E.M. & Timmer, J.B., 2002. "A note on NTU-convexity," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-90186, Tilburg University.
    3. Paul Milgrom, 2003. "Matching with Contracts," Working Papers 03003, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
    4. Roth, Alvin E, 1984. "The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(6), pages 991-1016, December.
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