On reciprocal Behavior in Prisoner Dilemma game
AbstractIn this paper, we introduce the concept of payoff distortion in the standard prisoner's dilemma game when strategies are driven by psychological behaviors. This concept enables to take account each player's assessment of the other player's behavior and the asymmetry of information. We determine the conditions which allow that mutual cooperation constitutes the equilibrium. we particularly focus on the reciprocity in case of complete and incomplete information about the payoffi distortion. We show that mutual cooperation is a Nash equilibrium with complete information and is a Bayesian equilibrium when each player believes that his opponent behaves with "large" reciprocity in incomplete information environment.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics in its series Jena Economic Research Papers with number 2009-072.
Date of creation: 25 Sep 2009
Date of revision:
Reciprocity; Behavior; Cooperation; prisoner's dilemma game.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-10-10 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2009-10-10 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-CTA-2009-10-10 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-EVO-2009-10-10 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2009-10-10 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2009-10-10 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2009-10-10 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2009-10-10 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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