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Employment Protection and Product Market Regulation

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Author Info
Koeniger, Winfried () (IZA Bonn)
Vindigni, Andrea (IIES, Stockholm University and IZA Bonn)

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Abstract

Product market regulation and employment protection are highly correlated across OECD countries. Using an augmented model of monopolistic competition we show why in countries with more regulated product markets, incumbent workers prefer to protect jobs relatively more. Product market regulation increases the scope for employment protection because firms can bear the cost of employment protection more easily and still break even. Moreover, product market regulation decreases employment so that the workers' outside option becomes relatively worse. This increases the incentive to protect the job.

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File URL: ftp://repec.iza.org/RePEc/Discussionpaper/dp880.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 880.

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Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp880

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Related research
Keywords: collective dismissal cost; political economy;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
J63 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs
J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
L16 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics; Macroeconomic Industrial Structure

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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Bruno Amable & Lilas Demmou & Donatella Gatti, 2007. "Employment Performance and Institutions: New Answers to an Old Question," IZA Discussion Papers 2731, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  2. Bruno Amable & Lilas Demmou & Donatella Gatti, 2006. "Institutions, unemployment and inactivity in the OECD countries," PSE Working Papers 2006-16, PSE (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
  3. Gilbert Cette & Jimmy Lopez, 2008. "What Explains the ICT Diffusion Gap Between the Major Industrialized Countries: An Empirical Analysis?," International Productivity Monitor, Centre for the Study of Living Standards, vol. 17, pages 28-39, Fall. [Downloadable!]
  4. Björn Brügemann, 2006. "Does Employment Protection Create Its Own Political Support?," IZA Discussion Papers 2286, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Ansgar Belke & Bernhard Herz & Lukas Vogel, 2007. "Reforms, Exchange Rates and Monetary Commitment: A Panel Analysis for OECD Countries," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 369-388, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Simon Deakin & Prabirjit Sarkar, 2008. "Assessing the Long-Run Economic Impact of Labour Law Systems: A Theoretical Reappraisal and Analysis of New Time Series Data," WEF Working Papers 0043, ESRC World Economy and Finance Research Programme, Birkbeck, University of London. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Helge Berger & Stephan Danninger, 2006. "The Employment Effects of Labor and Product Markets Deregulation and their Implications for Structural Reform," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  8. Helge Berger & Stephan Danninger, 2005. "Labor and Product Market Deregulation: Partial, Sequential, or Simultaneous Reform?," IMF Working Papers 05/227, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  9. Antonio Scialà & Riccardo Tilli, 2007. "Financing unemployment benefits by goods market competition: fiscal policy and deregulation with market imperfections," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0047, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno". [Downloadable!]
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