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The Effect of Economic Change and Elite Framing on Economic Preferences: A Survey Experiment

Author

Listed:
  • Marx, Paul

    (University of Bonn)

  • Schumacher, Gijs

    (University of Southern Denmark)

Abstract

An unresolved question in political science is how economic downturns affect citizens' economic left-right preferences. Existing observational studies fail to isolate the effect of economic conditions and the effect of elite framing of these conditions. We therefore designed a survey experiment to evaluate how economic change in conjunction with different elite frames impact on citizens' preferences for economic policies. We hypothesise and demonstrate that the effects of these frames differ by income group and partisanship. Our survey experiment – carried out in the UK – demonstrates that poor economic prospects motivate support for unemployment benefits vis-à-vis deficit reduction. Emphasis on government debt and deficits increases support for the latter policy option. Also, we find support for the hypothesis that partisans are less responsive to the economy than independents.

Suggested Citation

  • Marx, Paul & Schumacher, Gijs, 2014. "The Effect of Economic Change and Elite Framing on Economic Preferences: A Survey Experiment," IZA Discussion Papers 7979, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7979
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. Fong, Christina, 2001. "Social preferences, self-interest, and the demand for redistribution," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 225-246, November.
    5. Soroka, Stuart N. & Wlezien, Christopher, 2005. "Opinion–Policy Dynamics: Public Preferences and Public Expenditure in the United Kingdom," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 35(4), pages 665-689, October.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    economic preferences; economic crises; elite framing; survey experiment; UK;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • Z18 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Public Policy

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