What's the Use of Marriage?
AbstractWe use elementary game-theoretical concepts to compare domestic equilibria with and without marriage. In particular, we examine the effects of marriage legislation, matrimonial property regime, and divorce court sentencing practice, on the decision to marry, and on the choice of game conditional on marriage. We find that, in the absence of social stigma or legal discrimination against unmarried couples, a couple will marry only if marriage serves as a commitment device which facilitates cooperation.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 4635.
Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2009
Date of revision:
Publication status: published as 'Marriage as a commitment device' in: Review of Economics of the Household, 2012, 10 (2), 171-192
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
- J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
- J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
- J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
- J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
- K30 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-01-10 (All new papers)
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- Michael Burda & Daniel S. Hamermesh & Philippe Weil, 2012.
"Total Work and Gender: Facts and Possible Explanations,"
SFB 649 Discussion Papers
SFB649DP2012-007, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
- Michael Burda & Daniel Hamermesh & Philippe Weil, 2013. "Total work and gender: facts and possible explanations," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 239-261, January.
- Michael Burda & Hamermesh Daniel & Weil Philippe, 2012. "Total work and gender facts and possible explanations," Documents de Travail de l'OFCE 2012-03, Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE).
- Michael C Burda & Daniel S Hamermesh & Philippe Weil, 2012. "Total work and gender: facts and possible explanations," Sciences Po publications 2012-03, Sciences Po.
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