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Do bankers prefer married couples?

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  • Marion Leturcq

    ()
    (CREST - Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique - INSEE - École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Administration Économique, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris)

Abstract

Are married couples more credit constrained than unmarried households? If the cost of separation increases the risk of default, banks might be willing to lend to stable couples. In presence of incomplete information, marriage could be used as a signal of the quality of the match. This paper investigates the link between marriage and credit constraints. I use matching methods to evaluate the impact of marriage on credit constraints. I find that married couples are more likely to be approved for their loan, but they bear higher costs of credit. The differences between married and unmarried couples can be attributed to selection in the marriage rather than to discrimination against unmarried couples.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number halshs-00655584.

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Date of creation: Apr 2011
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Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00655584

Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00655584/en/
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Related research

Keywords: marriage; credit constraints; signal; matching estimator;

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References

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  1. Michael J. Brien & Lee A. Lillard & Steven Stern, 2006. "Cohabitation, Marriage, And Divorce In A Model Of Match Quality," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 47(2), pages 451-494, 05.
  2. Ke Chen Chen & Mali Chivakul, 2008. "What Drives Household Borrowing and Credit Constraints? Evidence From Bosnia and Herzegovina," IMF Working Papers 08/202, International Monetary Fund.
  3. Betsey Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, 2007. "Marriage and Divorce: Changes and their Driving Forces," NBER Working Papers 12944, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Midori Wakabayashi & Charles Yuji Horioka, 2005. "Borrowing Constraints and Consumption Behavior in Japan," ISER Discussion Paper 0640, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  5. Jaffee, Dwight M & Russell, Thomas, 1984. "Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and Credit Rationing: A Reply," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 99(4), pages 869-72, November.
  6. Duca, John V. & Rosenthal, Stuart S., 1994. "Borrowing constraints and access to owner-occupied housing," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 301-322, June.
  7. Patrick Kline, 2011. "Oaxaca-Blinder as a Reweighting Estimator," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(3), pages 532-37, May.
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Cited by:
  1. Marion Leturcq, 2011. "Competing marital contracts? The marriage after civil union in France," Working Papers halshs-00655585, HAL.

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