Determinants of Subordinated Debt Issuance by Japanese Regional Banks
AbstractThis paper empirically investigates the determinants of subordinated debt issuance by Japanese regional banks during the period 2000-2005 using a probit model. The empirical results suggest the following: (i) Throughout the period, Japanese regional banks with a lower capital/asset ratio have a higher incentive to issue subordinated debts because they are counted as Tier 2 capital under the Basel Accord. (ii) During the period of instability in the Japanese banking system ( 2000-2003), investors tended to intensively use financial variables such as the non-performing loan ratio, ROA, and total deposits outstanding to screen good banks for their investments in the subordinated debts. (iii) During the period after the banking system regained stability (2004-2005), investors tended to pay less attention to the above variables due mainly to the mitigated default risk of these banks.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan in its series IMES Discussion Paper Series with number 07-E-03.
Date of creation: Mar 2007
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
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- Daniel M. Covitz & Diana Hancock & Myron L. Kwast, 2004. "Market discipline in banking reconsidered: the roles of funding manager decisions and deposit insurance reform," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2004-53, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
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