Miscounts, Duverger's Law and Duverger's Hypothesis
AbstractIn real-life elections, vote-counting is often imperfect. We analyze the consequences of such imperfections in plurality and runoff rule voting games. We call a strategy profile a robust equilibrium if it is an equilibrium if the probability of a miscount is positive but small. All robust equilibria of plurality voting games satisfy Duverger's Law: In any robust equilibrium, exactly two candidates receive a positive number of votes. Moreover, robust- ness (only) rules out a victory of the Condorcet loser. All robust equilibria under runoff rule satisfy Duverger's Hypothesis: First round votes vare (almost always) dispersed over more than two alternatives. Robustness has strong implications for equilibrium outcomes under runoff rule: For large parts of the parameter space, the robust equilibrium outcome is unique.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University in its series Working Papers with number 380.
Date of creation: 2011
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-03-12 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2011-03-12 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2011-03-12 (Game Theory)
- NEP-POL-2011-03-12 (Positive Political Economics)
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- Matthias Messner & Mattias Polborn, 2007. "Strong and coalition-proof political equilibria under plurality and runoff rule," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 35(2), pages 287-314, January.
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