Fixed Water Sharing Agreements Sustainable to Drought
AbstractBy signing a fixed water sharing agreement (FWSA), countries voluntarily commit to release a fixed amount of river water in exchange for an agreed compensation. We examine the vulnerability of such commitments to reduced water ows. Among all FWSAs that are acceptable to riparian countries, we find out the one which is sustainable to the most severe drought scenarios. The so-called upstream incremental FWSA assigns to each country its marginal contribution to its followers in the river. Its mirror image, the downstream incremental FWSA, is not sustainable to reduced ow at the source. We apply our analysis to the Aral Sea basin agreement.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse in its series IDEI Working Papers with number 695.
Date of creation: Oct 2011
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, vol.�66, novembre 2013, p.�639-655.
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Other versions of this item:
- Ambec, Stefan & Dinar, Ariel & McKinney, Daene, 2011. "Fixed Water Sharing Agreements Sustainable to Drought," LERNA Working Papers 11.19.353, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
- Ambec, Stefan & Dinar, Ariel & McKinney, Daene, 2011. "Fixed Water Sharing Agreements Sustainable to Drought," TSE Working Papers 11-270, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water
- Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
- Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-03-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENV-2012-03-08 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2012-03-08 (Game Theory)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Cahiers de recherche
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