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Particularismo político alrededor del mundo

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Author Info
Jessica Seddon Wallack
Alejandro Gaviria
Ugo Panizza
Ernesto H. Stein

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Abstract

(Disponible en idioma inglés únicamente) En este trabajo se presenta un nuevo conjunto de datos sobre sistemas electorales y se bosqueja sus usos potenciales en nuevas investigaciones sobre las conexiones entre los sistemas electorales y los resultados económicos. El conjunto de datos brinda indicadores del grado al que políticos individuales pueden promover sus carreras apelando, por un lado, a grupos de electores de zonas geográficas reducidas o a simpatizantes de su partido por el otro.

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Paper provided by Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department in its series RES Working Papers with number 4290.

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Date of creation: Jan 2002
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Handle: RePEc:idb:wpaper:4290

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Yianos Kontopoulos & Roberto Perotti, 1999. "Government Fragmentation and Fiscal Policy Outcomes: Evidence from OECD Countries," NBER Chapters, in: Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance, pages 81-102 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
  2. Myerson, Roger B., 1999. "Theoretical comparisons of electoral systems," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 671-697, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Ugo Panizza, 2001. "Electoral Rules, Political Systems, and Institutional Quality," Economics and Politics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 13(3), pages 311-342, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Alessandro Lizzeri & Nicola Persico, 2001. "The Provision of Public Goods under Alternative Electoral Incentives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 225-239, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Roubini, Nouriel & Sachs, Jeffrey D., 1989. "Political and economic determinants of budget deficits in the industrial democracies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(5), pages 903-933, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Alesina, Alberto & Tabellini, Guido, 1990. "A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 57(3), pages 403-14, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, . "Political Institutions and Policy Outcomes: What are the Stylized Facts?," Working Papers 189, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-19.


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