Rank dependent expected utility models of tax evasion
AbstractIn this paper the rank-dependent expected utility theory is substituted for the expected utility theory in models of tax evasion. It is demonstrated that the comparative statics results of the expected utility, portfolio choice model of tax evasion carry over to the more general rank dependent expected utility model.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by ICER - International Centre for Economic Research in its series ICER Working Papers with number 27-2001.
Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2001
Date of revision:
Tax evasion; rank dependent expected utility; dual theory;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion
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