Optimal Provision of Public Goods with Rank Dependent Expected Utility
AbstractIn this paper the theory of rank-dependent expected utility (RDEU) is substituted for the theory of expected utility (EU) in a model of optimal provision of public goods. The substitution generalizes the Samuelson rule, previously modified to include deadweight loss and tax evasion loss.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Oslo University, Department of Economics in its series Memorandum with number 03/2003.
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 12 Oct 2002
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, University of Oslo, P.O Box 1095 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway
Phone: 22 85 51 27
Fax: 22 85 50 35
Web page: http://www.oekonomi.uio.no/indexe.html
More information through EDIRC
Tax evasion; optimal taxation; rank dependent expected utility;
Other versions of this item:
- Eide, Erling, 1998. "Optimal Provision of Public Goods with Rank Dependent Expected Utility," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 53(3-4), pages 296-311.
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion
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