Semiproportional Values for TU Games
AbstractThe goal of the paper is to introduce a family of values for transferable utility cooperative games that are proportional for two- person games and as well satisfying some combinatorial structure com- posed by contributions of complementary coalitions or, to less extent, marginal contributions by players.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by ICER - International Centre for Economic Research in its series ICER Working Papers with number 10-2001.
Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: May 2001
Date of revision:
cooperative TU game; value; proportional sharing; probabilistic model;
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- T. S. H. Driessen & D. Paulusma, 2001. "Two extensions of the Shapley value for cooperative games," Computational Statistics, Springer, vol. 53(1), pages 35-49, April.
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