Market-based Eurobonds Without Cross-Subsidisation
AbstractMost current Eurobond proposals imply substantial cross-subsidisation since some countries partially pay the risk premia for others, thus creating moral hazard and disincentives for fiscal discipline. We suggest, instead, to use standard technologies of financial intermediation like pooling and collateralizing risks. The proposed Eurobond system decreases the costs for all participating nations which is Pareto improving. Since collateral requirements are calculated on individual risk, we eliminate cross-subsidisation. It is essential for the model that a significant fraction of governmental bonds is still issued individually since the model utilizes the risk perception abilities and disciplinating functions of the private capital market. We also discuss institutional issues of possible implementations.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena in its series Global Financial Markets Working Paper Series with number 2012-37.
Date of creation: 2012
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Web page: http://www.gfinm.de
sovereign debt; Eurobond; collateral; pooling; cross-subsidisation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
- E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
- H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-12-06 (All new papers)
- NEP-EEC-2012-12-06 (European Economics)
- NEP-MAC-2012-12-06 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-RMG-2012-12-06 (Risk Management)
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