Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Social Networks in The Boardroom

Contents:

Author Info

  • Kramarz, Francis
  • Thesmar, David

Abstract

This paper provides empirical evidence consistent with the facts that (1) social networks may strongly affect board composition and (2) social networks may be detrimental to corporate governance. Our empirical investigation relies on a large dataset on executives and outside directors of corporations listed on the Paris stock exchange over the 1992-2003 period. This data source is a matched employer employee dataset providing both detailed information on directors/CEOs and information on the firm employing them. We first find a very strong and robust correlation between the CEO's network and that of his directors. Networks of former high ranking civil servants are the most active in shaping board composition. Our identification strategy takes into account (1) firm and directors' fixed effects and (2) matching of firms and director along one observable and one unobservable characteristic. We then turn to real effects of such network activity. We find that firms where these networks are most active are less likely to change CEO when they underperform. This suggests that social networks in the board room impair corporate governance.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/rs/bitstream/10086/13501/1/wp2006-20a.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University in its series CEI Working Paper Series with number 2006-20.

as in new window
Length: 44 p.
Date of creation: Mar 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hit:hitcei:2006-20

Note: November 15, 2006
Contact details of provider:
Postal: 2-1 Naka, Kunitachi, Tokyo 186-8603
Phone: 042-580-8405
Fax: 042-580-8333
Email:
Web page: http://cei.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. L'affaire Proglio
    by obouba in Olivier Bouba-Olga on 2010-01-24 11:45:00
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Perihan Ozge Saygin & Andrea Weber & Michèle A. Weynandt, 2014. "Coworkers, Networks, and Job Search Outcomes," NRN working papers 2014-06, The Austrian Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of the Welfare State, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
  2. Renée Adams & Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 2008. "The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey," NBER Working Papers 14486, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Yann Bramoullé & Sanjeev Goyal, 2009. "Favoritism," Cahiers de recherche 0941, CIRPEE.
  4. Ponzo, Michela & Scoppa, Vincenzo, 2011. "A simple model of favouritism in recruitment," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 78-88, June.
  5. Ponzo, Michela & Scoppa, Vincenzo, 2009. "The Use of Informal Networks in Italy: Efficiency or Favoritism?," MPRA Paper 17281, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Braggion, F., 2008. "Managers, Firms and (Secret) Social Networks: The Economics of Freemasonry," Discussion Paper 2008-36, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  7. Lippert, Steffen & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2004. "Networks of Relations," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 28, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  8. Lars Calmfors & Giancarlo Corsetti & Michael P. Devereux & Seppo Honkapohja & Gilles Saint-Paul & Hans-Werner Sinn & Jan-Egbert Sturm & Xavier Vives, 2007. "Chapter 6: Economic nationalism," EEAG Report on the European Economy, CESifo Group Munich, vol. 0, pages 133-147, 02.
  9. Chiraz Ben Ali & Frédéric Teulon, 2014. "CEO Monitoring and board effectiveness - Resolving CEO compensation issue," Working Papers 2014-045, Department of Research, Ipag Business School.
  10. Zudenkova, Galina, 2011. "Cronyism in Business, Public Sector and Politics," MPRA Paper 30231, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  11. Erich Battistin & Clara Graziano & G. Parigi, 2008. "Connections and Performance in Bankers' Turnover: Better Wed over the Mixen than over the Moor," CESifo Working Paper Series 2439, CESifo Group Munich.
  12. Stuart, Toby E. & Yim, Soojin, 2010. "Board interlocks and the propensity to be targeted in private equity transactions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(1), pages 174-189, July.
  13. Clare Leaver & Jordi Blances i Vidal, 2007. "Behaviour in Networks of Collaborators: Theory and Evidence from the English Judiciary," Economics Series Working Papers 354, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hit:hitcei:2006-20. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Reiko Suzuki).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.