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Leniency program and cartel deterrence in Russia: effects assessment

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  • Gyuzel Yusupova

    ()
    (National Research University Higher School of Economics, Institute of Industrial and Market Studies, associate professor)

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    Abstract

    The empirical assessment of leniency program (LP) in Russia shows the effects of changes in the rules on the behavior of market participants. In this paper we test hypotheses about LP enforcement against the characteristics of cartels: their subject, duration and the number of participants. We show that LP in Russia makes enforcement of the behavior of market participants less effective and accordingly reduces cartel discoveries. However the reforms of Program in 2009 give some positive results

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    File URL: http://www.hse.ru/data/2013/11/25/1336944759/06PA2013.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by National Research University Higher School of Economics in its series HSE Working papers with number WP BRP 06/PA/2013.

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    Length: 22 pages
    Date of creation: 2013
    Date of revision:
    Publication status: Published in WP BRP Series: Public Administration / PA, November 2013, pages 1-22
    Handle: RePEc:hig:wpaper:06/pa/2013

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    Keywords: Leniency Program; Collusion; Antitrust legislation;

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    1. Fraas, Arthur G & Greer, Douglas F, 1977. "Market Structure and Price Collusion: An Empirical Analysis," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(1), pages 21-44, September.
    2. Motchenkova, E., 2004. "Effects of Leniency Programs on Cartel Stability," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center 2004-020, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
    3. S. Avdasheva & A. Shastitko., 2011. "Economic Analysis in Cases Settled According to the Law "On the Protection of Competition"," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 2.
    4. Aubert, Cécile & Rey, Patrick & Kovacic, William E., 2006. "The impact of leniency and whistle-blowing programs on cartels," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/13637, Paris Dauphine University.
    5. Klein, Gordon J., 2010. "Cartel destabilization and leniency programs: Empirical evidence," ZEW Discussion Papers 10-107, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    6. Aubert, Cecile & Rey, Patrick & Kovacic, William E., 2006. "The impact of leniency and whistle-blowing programs on cartels," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 1241-1266, November.
    7. Friedman, James W, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(113), pages 1-12, January.
    8. Andrei Yakovlev & Olga Demidova, 2012. "Access of firms to public procurement in Russia in the 2000s: before and after radical reform of regulation," International Journal of Economic Policy in Emerging Economies, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 5(2), pages 140-157.
    9. Andrey Shastitko & Svetlana Avdasheva, 2011. "Introduction of Leniency Programs for Cartel Participants: The Russian Case," Antitrust Chronicle, Competition Policy International, Competition Policy International, vol. 8.
    10. Svetlana Avdasheva & Andrei Shastitko, 2011. "Russian anti-trust policy: power of enforcement versus quality of rules," Post-Communist Economies, Taylor & Francis Journals, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(4), pages 493-505, June.
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