Leniency program and cartel deterrence in Russia: effects assessment
AbstractThe empirical assessment of leniency program (LP) in Russia shows the effects of changes in the rules on the behavior of market participants. In this paper we test hypotheses about LP enforcement against the characteristics of cartels: their subject, duration and the number of participants. We show that LP in Russia makes enforcement of the behavior of market participants less effective and accordingly reduces cartel discoveries. However the reforms of Program in 2009 give some positive results
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Research University Higher School of Economics in its series HSE Working papers with number WP BRP 06/PA/2013.
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in WP BRP Series: Public Administration / PA, November 2013, pages 1-22
Leniency Program; Collusion; Antitrust legislation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-12-06 (All new papers)
- NEP-CIS-2013-12-06 (Confederation of Independent States)
- NEP-COM-2013-12-06 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-LAW-2013-12-06 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-TRA-2013-12-06 (Transition Economics)
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