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Rewards and Copyrights with Hidden Information

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Author Info
Sandén, Klas () (Centre for Labour Market Policy Research (CAFO))
Abstract

This paper makes a theoretical contribution by investigating how the optimal copyright legislation depend on hidden information. A mixed hidden action – hidden information model is used. The regulator neither observes the type of firm nor the quality choice of firms. The paper provides no evidence that hidden information can motivate a copyright legislation. In fact it shows that the optimal policy, with asymmetric information, is a reward system that is second best.

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File URL: http://www.vxu.se/ehv/filer/forskning/cafo/wps/Nek_wp4_09.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Centre for Labour Market Policy Research (CAFO), School of Management and Economics, Växjö University in its series CAFO Working Papers with number 2009:4.

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Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 26 Sep 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:vxcafo:2009_004

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Centre for Labour Market Policy Research (CAFO), Dept of Economics and Statistics, School of Management and Economics, Växjö University, SE 351 95 Växjö, Sweden
Phone: +46 470 70 87 64
Web page: http://www.vxu.se/ehv/english/research/research_fields/cafo/
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Related research
Keywords: Asymmetric information; Copyright; Reward system; Legislation;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Banerjee, Dyuti S., 2003. "Software piracy: a strategic analysis and policy instruments," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 97-127, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Shavell, Steven & van Ypersele, Tanguy, 2001. "Rewards versus Intellectual Property Rights," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(2), pages 525-47, October.
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  3. Johnson, William R, 1985. "The Economics of Copying," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(1), pages 158-74, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-30.

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