Rewards and Copyrights with Hidden Information
AbstractThis paper makes a theoretical contribution by investigating how the optimal copyright legislation depend on hidden information. A mixed hidden action – hidden information model is used. The regulator neither observes the type of firm nor the quality choice of firms. The paper provides no evidence that hidden information can motivate a copyright legislation. In fact it shows that the optimal policy, with asymmetric information, is a reward system that is second best.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centre for Labour Market Policy Research (CAFO), School of Business and Economics, Linnaeus University in its series CAFO Working Papers with number 2009:4.
Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 26 Sep 2008
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Centre for Labour Market Policy Research (CAFO), School of Business and Economics, Linnaeus University, SE 351 95 Växjö, Sweden
Phone: +46 470 70 87 64
Web page: http://lnu.se/research-groups/cafo?l=en
More information through EDIRC
Asymmetric information; Copyright; Reward system; Legislation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-03-07 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2009-03-07 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-IPR-2009-03-07 (Intellectual Property Rights)
- NEP-LAB-2009-03-07 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-REG-2009-03-07 (Regulation)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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"Rewards versus Intellectual Property Rights,"
Journal of Law and Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(2), pages 525-47, October.
- Ypersele, T.P.M.C. van & Shavell, S., 1999. "Rewards versus Intellectual Property Rights," Discussion Paper 1999-26, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, 1999. "Rewards versus Intellectual Property Rights," NBER Working Papers 6956, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- SHAVELL, Steven & VAN YPERSELE, Tanguy, . "Rewards versus intellectual property rights," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1597, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Novos, Ian E & Waldman, Michael, 1984. "The Effects of Increased Copyright Protection: An Analytic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(2), pages 236-46, April.
- Johnson, William R, 1985. "The Economics of Copying," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(1), pages 158-74, February.
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