The medical doctors as gatekeepers in the sickness insurance?
AbstractBased on a randomised experiment we estimate effects from notification to medical doctors of tighter monitoring of their medical certificates. Both time prescribed by the doctor certificates for sick leave (prescribed sick leave) and the impact on the length of the actual sickness absence (actual sick leave) is studied. We find no effect on the total number of prescribed sick leave days. We do, however, find an increase in both prescribed and actual sick leave with a 25 percent work inability. We also find that the notification letter causes an increase in actual sick leave (i.e. the number of reimbursed sick days). We discuss a number of potential explanations for this rather surprising result.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Uppsala University, Department of Economics in its series Working Paper Series, Center for Labor Studies with number 2010:4.
Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: 01 Jun 2009
Date of revision:
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Postal: Department of Economics, Uppsala University, P. O. Box 513, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden
Phone: + 46 18 471 25 00
Fax: + 46 18 471 14 78
Web page: http://www.nek.uu.se/
More information through EDIRC
monitoring; moral hazard; public social insurance;
Other versions of this item:
- Per Engstr�m & Per Johansson, 2012. "The medical doctors as gatekeepers in the sickness insurance?," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 44(28), pages 3615-3625, October.
- C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
- H51 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Health
- H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
- J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Assar Lindbeck & Marten Palme & Mats Persson, 2008.
"Social Interaction and Sickness Absence,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
2215, CESifo Group Munich.
- Lindbeck, Assar & Palme, Mårten & Persson, Mats, 2009. "Social Interaction and Sickness Absence," Research Papers in Economics 2009:4, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
- Lindbeck, Assar & Palme, Mårten & Persson, Mats, 2007. "Social Interaction and Sickness Absence," Working Paper Series 725, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- Avdic, Daniel & Johansson, Per, 2013.
"Gender differences in preferences for health-related absences from work,"
Working Paper Series
2013:13, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
- Avdic, Daniel & Johansson, Per, 2013. "Gender Differences in Preferences for Health-Related Absences from Work," IZA Discussion Papers 7480, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
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