We introduce strategic wage bargaining in a search equilibrium model. We find that wages respond more an employment and output less to aggreagte shoks than when wages are determined by conventional Nash bargaining. Expectations about the stocks increase the volatility of wages even more.
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Paper provided by Oslo University, Department of Economics in its series Memorandum with number
02/1996.
Find related papers by JEL classification: J30 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - General J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law