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Making Bank: Why High Bank Leverage is Optimal - for the Bank's Shareholders

Author

Listed:
  • Atreya, Nikhil

    (Dept. of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics)

  • Mjøs, Aksel

    (Dept. of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics)

  • Persson, Svein-Arne

    (Dept. of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics)

Abstract

We create a structural credit model to calculate the optimal capital structure for a bank that provides asset backed loans, such as corporate loans and mortgages. The bank's assets are loans, which means that the bank's exposure to risk is mitigated by the borrower's equity. We capture the effect of this mitigation by including the borrower's leverage, in addition to its asset volatility, as the sources of risk for the bank. Our results contribute a quantitative explanation for the high levels of bank leverage observed in practice. When unconstrained by regulation, the bank's shareholders find it optimal, for reasonable values of borrower risk parameters, to select a bank leverage close to 100%.

Suggested Citation

  • Atreya, Nikhil & Mjøs, Aksel & Persson, Svein-Arne, 2015. "Making Bank: Why High Bank Leverage is Optimal - for the Bank's Shareholders," Discussion Papers 2015/33, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:nhhfms:2015_033
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11250/2365955
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Structural credit model; optimal capital structure; asset backed loans;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G00 - Financial Economics - - General - - - General
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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