Trade and Communication Under Subjective Information
AbstractThis paper models an economy where agents perceive the choices they face subjectively, and have subjective interpretations of the terminology they use in a shared business language. Preferences are defined on what an agent perceives, and not on what is objectively presented to an agent. A business language enables agents to trade, provided the terminology in the language is sufficiently vague: once agents can express more detail than their trading partners can perceive, the language ceases to be useful. Under some regularity conditions on the language, an appropriately defined notion of competitive equilibrium exists. However, much less can be said about welfare than in the neoclassical case, as there are counter-examples to both welfare theorems.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 2006/2.
Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: 03 Mar 2006
Date of revision:
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Postal: NHH, Department of Business and Management Science, Helleveien 30, N-5045 Bergen, Norway
Phone: +47 55 95 92 93
Fax: +47 55 95 96 50
Web page: http://www.nhh.no/en/research-faculty/department-of-business-and-management-science.aspx
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Language; Perceptual Limits; Unawareness;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C65 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Miscellaneous Mathematical Tools
- D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Accounting - - - Accounting
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